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American Messiahs: The Narrative
Strategies of FDR and Reagan, 1933
and 1981
Theo Zenou
1 In July 2012, while running for re-election, President Barack Obama was asked about
the biggest mistake of his first term. For a politician on the campaign trail, his reply
was surprisingly candid: “The mistake of my first term … was thinking that this job was
just about getting the policy right. … But the nature of this office is also to tell a story to
the  American  people  that  gives  them a  sense  of  unity  and  purpose  and  optimism,
especially during tough times.”1
2 Armed with Obama’s insight, this article goes back to two instances of “tough times” in
modern American history: the Great Depression and the late 1970s-1980 stagflation. It
asks  what stories  did  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt  and  Ronald  Reagan  –  the  presidents
respectively elected to solve these crises – tell the people and why. It looks specifically
at the period when they entered office, in 1933 and in 1981, and seeks to illuminate how
Roosevelt’s and Reagan’s stories illustrated their political strategy.
3 No historical analogy is ever perfect, and neither is this article’s. While the crises in
1933  and  1981  were  both  severe,  it  is  obvious  they  were  not  on  par.  The  Great
Depression devastated the American economy far more than stagflation. And yet, in
early 1981, comparisons were drawn between the two. Reagan himself said: “We’re in
the worst economic mess since the Great Depression.”2 However tempting it might be
to dismiss so dramatic a pronouncement as alarmism serving the president’s agenda, it
actually  reflected  a  sentiment  prevalent at  the  time.  For  instance,  New  York  Times
economic columnist Leonard Silk wrote that “stagflation threatens America’s economic
strength as seriously as did depression in the 1930’s.”3 Hindsight now tells us this did
not  happen.  But  while  history  is  written with hindsight,  it  is  experienced without.
Hence, to many in 1981, stagflation felt like a dangerous crisis that could well spiral
into another Great Depression.
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4 Beyond a dire economy, what made the situation in 1981 similar to that in 1933 was the
lack of confidence people had in the future and, crucially, in politicians’ ability to make
things better.4 As Silk reflected when comparing the two periods, “Now, as then … the
nation  is  plagued  by  anxiety  over  its  economic  future  …  a  key  part  of  the  job  of
reconstruction will be psychological.”5 In other words, the role that Reagan would have
to play once in office was not so different from the one Roosevelt had played upon
ascending  the  presidency:  To  reassure  and  motivate  a  weary  nation.  That  is  why
journalists frequently likened the Republican to his Democratic predecessor – a parallel
that greatly pleased Reagan. In fact, he had laid the groundwork for it by appropriating
Roosevelt’s own terminology during the 1980 campaign, leading The New York Times to
run  a  provocative  headline  that  read:  “Franklin  Delano  Reagan.”  As  William  E.
Leuchtenburg succinctly puts it: “Reagan presented himself as Rooseveltian.”6
5 The rationale for focusing on these two presidents, and the starts of their tenures, also
lies  in  the  scholarship  of  political  scientist  Stephen  Skowronek.  According  to  him,
Roosevelt and Reagan were “reconstructive presidents” – meaning presidents elected
in volatile times who birthed a new political “regime,” and a new political philosophy
underpinning this “regime.”7 This article, then, aims to explore the narrative strategies
with which these two “reconstructive” presidents opened their time in office.
6 The argument is that – despite manifold political differences – the stories Roosevelt and
Reagan told were similar, and advanced their ambition to transform American politics.
The two presidents formulated their stories in the wake of economic crises that had left
Americans with little faith in the status quo. Consequently, they bore striking parallels.
By way of speeches, Roosevelt and Reagan both depicted America as a land in the grip
of  blight,  ruined  by  the  avarice  and  duplicity  of  elites.  Men  of  intense  faith,  the
presidents portrayed themselves as messiahs sent by God to make America rise from
the ashes.  Ultimately,  the presidents both used their stories to signpost the radical
change they wished to engender, and shape a new political imagination.
 
The Literature
7 In The Power and the Story, Evan Cornog claims “the essence of American presidential
leadership, and the secret of presidential success, is storytelling.”1 Cornog’s is the first
major  work  that  looks  at  the  U.S.  presidency  through  the  lens  of  political
“storytelling.” It is panoramic (spanning 43 presidents) and multi-focused (dealing with
all  kinds of presidential  stories from biographies to political  and media narratives).
Cornog chooses to structure his study according to “the trajectory of an archetypal
man of power … from the politician’s first emergence as a public figure through his rise
to national prominence, the presidential campaign, the exercise of power, reelection
and defeat, and then his efforts to reinterpret and redefine the story until his death.”2
As a consequence, while Cornog offers a systemic interpretation, even a kind of unified
field theory, of the presidency along the lines of storytelling, he does not – cannot –
sharpen his focus to offer in-depth analysis of any single president. The Power and the
Story, therefore, leaves plenty of room for more pointed studies like this article’s.
8 Following in Cornog’s footsteps, other scholars have tackled political storytelling with
approaches ranging from the theoretical to the historical.3 Those whose work is most
relevant to this article are Christian Salmon and Jan Hanska. Salmon has authored a
key conceptual text, the monograph Storytelling,  in which he details how politicians,
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advertisers and military leaders have used narrative – the “storytelling machine” – to
accrue their control over society. He makes no mention of Roosevelt, but he identifies
Reagan as a master practitioner of “‘narratocracy.’”4 Hanska, meanwhile, explores that
narratocracy in Reagan’s Mythical America.5 His approach differs greatly from that of this
article. Broad, he surveys Reagan’s entire political career. As such he allows, invites
even, approaches that look at a specific period of Reagan’s presidency.
9 Beyond the relatively recent literature concerned with political storytelling, one can
also turn to studies of  presidential  rhetoric for insights into Roosevelt  and Reagan.
Mary  E.  Stuckey  and  Paul  D.  Erickson  are  successful  in  showing  how  both  leaders
respectively deployed biblical imagery.6 Robert Dallek, meanwhile, provides a strong
assessment of Reagan as a leader apt at using symbolism.7 However, these scholars –
unlike  this  article  –  do  not  try  to  identify  overarching  “stories”  in  the  presidents’
rhetoric, much less during a single, specific period of Roosevelt’s and Reagan’s tenures:
their first months in office.
10 While much has been written about Roosevelt’s famed “first hundred days” (March to
June 1933), it mostly pertains to policymaking.8 A notable exception is David W. Houck’s
FDR and Fear Itself, which focuses on the inaugural address.9 Few studies, meanwhile,
have been attempted about Reagan’s own “first hundred days”-period, which actually
spanned  six  months  (January  to  July  1981)  –  the  time  it  took  him  to  launch  his
presidency, argue for Reaganomics, and achieve enactment of the Economic Recovery
Tax Act.10
 
A Note on Theory
11 Story, narrative, storytelling: These terms originate from the fields of literary/dramatic
theory where they have specific, often hotly-debated, meanings. It is worth nothing
that, with this article, no attempt is being made to contribute to those fields. Indeed, I
am borrowing insights  from theory to  shine  a  light  on presidential  leadership  and
political strategy, not the other way around.
12 This  article  defines  a  political  story  as  the  narrative  that  pervades  the  public
communications of a statesman (speeches, interviews, TV and campaign appearances,
etc.). This is in keeping with Roland Barthes’ capacious definition of narrative: “Among
the vehicles of narratives are articulated language, whether oral or written, pictures,
still or moving, gestures, and an ordered mixture of all those substances; narrative is
present  in  myth,  legend,  fables,  tales,  short  stories,  epics,  history,  tragedy,  drame 
[suspense drama], comedy, pantomime, paintings … stained-glassed windows, movies,
local news, conversation.”1
13 Roosevelt and Reagan were not only the narrators of their stories; they were also the
protagonists  at  the  heart  of  those  narratives,  what  Hanska  calls  the  “dramatis,  or
rather the narratis, persona.”2 By being both in the story and the ones telling the story,
Roosevelt and Reagan were thus able not only to propose their own version of events,
but also to portray themselves as they wished to be seen.
14 As  of  the  question  of  authorship  –  ie.  who  deserves  credit  for  the  presidential
narratives: the presidents or their strategists/speechwriters? – this article sides with
Hanska  when  he  writes  that  “in  a  political  narration  the  narratorship  is  more
important than the origins of the words that combine into a story.”3 Indeed without the
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narrator-president, there not only cannot be a story, there is also no one to tell that
story.
15 To make a cinematic analogy: Roosevelt and Reagan were the “auteurs” (if not always
the writers) of their stories.4 This observation was actually made by journalist Sidney
Blumenthal, in 1981, when covering the Reagan administration. He surmised that “the
former actor is more than White House leading man; he’s the auteur.”5 This article
similarly  regards  presidents  as  the  “auteurs”  of  their  stories  –  since  they  are  the
narrators.  And it  ultimately draws attention to the way Roosevelt  and Reagan used
narrative as a tool to fulfil their ambition to transform American politics.
 
Roosevelt as Messiah
16 A  narrative  reading  of  Franklin  D.  Roosevelt’s  speeches  shows  that  he  portrayed
himself  as  a  messiah.  This  might  be  because, according to  Frances  Perkins,  a  close
friend  as  well  as  political  associate,  he  saw himself  as  fulfilling  God’s  will.  Indeed,
Roosevelt  believed  that  he  was  “an  actor  placed  on  the  stake  [sic]  by  Divine
providence.”1 This belief stemmed from his non-dogmatic yet intense faith – one of the
hallmarks of the president’s character.2 Even so, as Gary Scott Smith notes, Roosevelt’s
piety has seldom been analysed by historians.3
17 This  might  be  because,  as  Andrew Preston remarks  in  his  study of  religion in  U.S.
foreign relations, most “modern historians[’] … worldview is not framed by religious
faith.” Consequently,  scholars have often dismissed politicians’  religiosity as having
little to no bearing on their policies or decisions.4 But in the case of Roosevelt, this is
beginning  to  change  thanks  to  Christine  Wicker.  She  holds  that  the  president’s
“worldview and much of his personality was shaped by the strength and vibrancy of his
Episcopal  faith,  which  was  fed  by  his  sense  of  a  continuing  relationship  by  God.”
Elsewhere,  Wicker  writes  plainly  that  “he believed God communicated with human
beings, himself in particular.”5
18 On the morning of his inauguration on March 4, 1933, Roosevelt attended services at St.
John’s Church along with members of his inner circle. The rector had written a special
hymn  for  the  new  president,  beseeching  God  for  “Thy  blessing  upon  Thy  servant,
Franklin.”6 The story he told the American people would indicate that – as Perkins
revealed – Roosevelt did share the sentiment prevalent in the prayer. Indeed, he sought
to become a kind of American prophet, a redeemer with the necessary inspiration to
revive sacred values and place them at the heart of society. Roosevelt cast himself in
the halo of the spiritual repeatedly. The most direct evidence of this can be found in his
proclamation that he was ordaining an assembly of “prophets of a new order.”7 He
labelled his policies a “common covenant,” of which he was the keeper, and he urged
the American people to keep the faith despite the criticisms or fabrications – in other
words the heresy – they might hear about Roosevelt’s plans.8
19 Scholars have long tiptoed around the argument that Roosevelt depicted himself as
messiah.  Gary  Scott  Smith  contends  that  Roosevelt  “frequently  asserted  that  God
directed history, considered himself to be God’s agent” adding that he “saw himself as
carrying out God’s purposes.”9 Smith stops short, however, of following through on the
messianic  implications of  his  observation.  Mary E.  Stuckey does but  then dismisses
them,  stating  that  “while  the  president  employed  rhetoric  that  enabled  such
[messianic] associations, he was more likely to assume the role of preacher than of
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biblical  character.”10 But  Moses  and  Jesus,  the  biblical  characters  to  whom  she  is
referring, were also preachers.11 In the biblical tradition, most prophets are preachers,
even  if  the  opposite  is  not  so.  In  the  framework  of  his  story,  Roosevelt  was  both
preacher (narrator) and prophet (“narratis persona”). The president’s messianism was
deftly woven through the story, hinted at rather strongly but never expressed in such
outright terms as to become boastful or, worse, clumsy. Raymond Moley, who wrote the
bulk of Roosevelt’s inaugural address, certainly seemed aware of the prophetic parallels
evoked by that speech.12
20 One way for Roosevelt to present himself as a messiah was to make biblical references,
widely  known  in  society,  and  using  them  as  shorthand  for  characterisation.  A
memorable  instance  can  be  found  in  Roosevelt’s  inaugural  address.  The  president
described the American elites – the bankers and politicians whom he held responsible
for the Great Depression – as the “money changers … in the temple of our civilization.”
13 As  has  already  been  noted  by  Ronald  Isetti  in  an  article  exploring  Roosevelt’s
religious language, this alluded to an episode in the New Testament in which Jesus casts
out the wicked merchants from the temple’s courtyard.14 But Roosevelt did more than
simply infuse his rhetoric with the vernacular of scripture.
21 Indeed, his very story played out like a modern re-telling of Biblical myths, all leading
to the inevitable portrayal of Roosevelt as the anointed one. He depicted America as a
land ruined by the avarice of self-seeking elites and the hypocrisy of “false” leaders.15
They were personified as “false prophets” that had led “many amongst us [to] have
made obeisance to Mammon.”16 Darkness engulfed the country, and the people were
crying out for a saviour.17 The people, Roosevelt proclaimed, had “to seek new leaders
of our own choosing.”18 To quote an aide of the new president, “the stage was obviously
set for the entry of … Roosevelt as the hero of the new drama.”19 Indeed, against this
grim backdrop, an age-old battle – in narrative terms a conflict – was being waged,
juxtaposing  the  forces  of  good and evil.  Roosevelt,  as  Stuckey  observes,  frequently
resorted to Manichean oppositions over his twelve-year presidency.20 And at the start,
it  was to castigate the “evils of the old order” and contrastingly exalt  his brand of
righteous leadership.
22 Moreover, part of Roosevelt’s political playbook was to have avowed enemies.21 It was
also an important device in his story. Repeatedly, he accused the members of the old
order – though he seldom referred to them by their actual names – of engendering the
demise of America. They were labelled blind whilst Roosevelt had vision, selfish whilst
he was selfless, venal whilst he was ethical.22 He strongly hinted they were foul when he
insisted  his  party  was  the  one  with  “clean  hands.”23 Even  once  he  was  in  office,
Roosevelt continued to narrate this high-stakes conflict, although, by then, most likely
because he was no longer campaigning, his antagonists had become more abstract. In
his inaugural, the president famously proclaimed that “the only thing we have to fear is
fear  itself,”  subsequently  turning “the  phantom of  fear”  into  the  people’s  ominous
adversary.24
23 Historians have remarked that, in 1933, Roosevelt described the Great Depression as a
war,  and the narrative reading of  the president as  messiah means this  war carried
spiritual connotations. William E. Leuchtenburg was the first to notice this allegory of
the Depression as war.25 It was not a metaphor but an apt description of reality for
many Americans.  As  Leuchtenburg  argues  –  and this  statement  also  applies  to  the
reasoning behind this article – “the metaphors a nation employs reveal much about
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how it perceives reality. The words people use bare the bedrock of its beliefs. Moreover,
they are not neutral artifacts;  they shape ideas and behavior.”26 Roosevelt,  it  would
seem, was very much aware of this. He made his martial leadership explicit when he
affirmed that “I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army of our people
dedicated to a disciplined attack upon our common problems.”27 He frequently extolled
military values, most notably the merits of discipline, commitment to the mission and
loyalty to the group. Roosevelt put military language in the service of his messianic
story. He presented his campaign, and by inference his presidential mandate, as more
than political. It was, in his words, “a call to arms … [a] crusade” he was to lead.28
24 And only a week after assuming power, he used narrative to influence reality. In his
first fireside chat, Roosevelt spoke like a general commanding his troops. The mission
was simple. Due to overwhelming cash withdrawals, he had ordered the closure of all
banks  to  stabilise  the  market.  They were  to  re-open,  however,  to  enable  economic
recovery.  Yet,  for  this  plan  to  succeed,  it  was  paramount  that  ordinary  Americans
deposit their cash back into the very banks they had thought insolvent. After laying
this objective starkly – and explaining why the course of action was sound – Roosevelt
urged, in essence, for his foot soldiers to obey his orders unquestioningly, and do so for
the good of the nation.29 Perkins observed that the president’s “quality of being one
with the people” – in other words, his convincing show that he was speaking on their
behalf, that he was being literally their spokesman – “made it possible for him to be a
leader  without  ever  being  …  a  dictator.”30 The  people,  after  all,  were  the  flock
Roosevelt’s messianic protagonist was to lead to the promised land.
25 If the Moses-like interpretation of Roosevelt appears far-fetched by today’s standards, a
portion of the American people, in 1933, actually believed in it. The flurry of letters
mailed to the White House during the first hundred days was unprecedented in the
history of the presidency.31 Many of these letters were not concerned with policy but
were, instead, emotional reactions to Roosevelt’s story. The letters were tinged with
spiritual  connotations.  Writing after  the first  fireside  chat  on banking,  one woman
wrote that in the years previous America had “lost [its] soul.” The people had “cried for
a Leader.” And, according to her, out of this misery Roosevelt had emerged as “the
passionate  …  crusader.”  She  ended  her  letter  by  sharing  her  view  of  Roosevelt  as
“Leader.” Indeed, she suggested that he was not only the people’s president, but also
God’s  president.  In  fact,  to  her,  they  were  one  and  the  same,  as  she  professed  to
believing that “the voice of God was the voice of the people last November,” referring
to the presidential election.32 Another ordinary citizen literally compared Roosevelt to
the prophets he had, in his story, modelled himself after but never outrightly named:
After listening to your wonderful talk Sunday a week ago – we all felt … that you
were sent for our delivery. When in times of deep distress God took pity on His
people. He sent Moses to deliver the oppressed. Then He sent Jesus Christ – to show
His people how to live – to redeem them – Then you a Comforter to put confidence
in this so great a people.33
26 Some Americans,  then,  perceived Roosevelt  as  a  messianic  figure.  When examining
letters from the public to Roosevelt (in this case during a longer period from 1933 to
1936), Isetti found that his supporters often compared the president to Moses, with one
woman claiming that God had sent him “to deliver us from the hands of the oppressors
as truly as He did Moses.”34 This image of Roosevelt as a divine agent was pervasive
enough  that  in  December  1933,  at  the  annual  meeting  of  the  Protestant  Episcopal
Church’s  New  York  Diocese,  a  reverend  felt  the  need  to  state  on  the  record  that
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Roosevelt was not a messiah. The man of God expressed his genuine disgust “at the
baselessness  of this  pathetic  and  pitiful  superstition,”  which,  he  deplored,  was
nonetheless espoused by “thousands of men.”35
27 It is unknown to what extent the White House reflected on these reactions to their
story, but officials knew of the quasi-religious devotion their story had engendered,
particularly  amongst  the  most  disfranchised  classes.  In  1934,  Harry  Hopkins,  then
administrator of the New Deal’s Federal Emergency Relief Association, hired a team of
journalists  to  investigate  poverty  in  the  country.36 Among  them  was  future  star
journalist  Martha  Gellhorn.  Her  reports  were  impressionistic  dispatches  from  an
America  hit  hard  by  the  Great  Depression.  The  young  reporter  meticulously
documented  her  interactions  with  those  people  who  saw  themselves  as  living
embodiments of  Roosevelt’s  “forgotten man.” With each story Gellhorn related,  the
president emerged more and more as a figure of intense popular worship, the subject of
an  emotional  phenomenon  that  bordered  on  the  religious.  Indeed,  in  a  report  of
November 11, 1934, Gellhorn revealed to Hopkins that she heard someone say, with
earnestness and gravity: “We trust in the Supreme Being and Franklin Roosevelt.”37
28 Similarly, in her study of religiosity in the Depression-era South, Alison Collis Greene
writes that for many people in those days, “it was time for a higher power to intervene.
They looked to God, and then they looked to Roosevelt.”38 For some, it seemed that the
president’s power was divinely sanctioned. The primary role of (his) government was to
accomplish, under his stewardship, God’s work on Earth. After all, the opening line of
his inaugural address – which Roosevelt had added himself at the last minute – was:
“This is a day of national consecration.” According to Houck, that is because the soon-
to-be president had “wanted something to mark this moment as sacred, ordained by
[God] … God should be invoked from the outset of his administration.”39
29 In a report dated April 25, 1935, Gellhorn observed that many she encountered had an
“almost mystic belief in Mr. Roosevelt”40 This “belief” – what the Episcopalian reverend
had called a “superstition” – was no accident: Roosevelt’s story had had a lot to do with
it  (and  presumably,  of  course,  so  did  other  factors  such  as  the  New  Deal’s  relief
programmes). It all pointed back to the president’s self-characterisation as a prophetic
figure – one that stemmed from his conviction he had been chosen by providence to
lead America out of the Great Depression. In his speeches, he had systematically and
consistently explained the Depression by telling a story. He presented America as laden
with sin, and the political and financial classes as crass worshippers of Mammon – one
of the princes of hell. In contrast, he portrayed himself as a messiah sent by God to
purge America and lead the people to greener pastures. To tell this story, Roosevelt
drew primarily on the Bible, which he knew intimately, although he cared little about
nuances of theology and interpretation.41 What mattered was the story.
 
Reagan as Messiah
30 A narrative reading of Ronald Reagan’s speeches shows that,  just like Roosevelt,  he
presented himself to the American people as a messiah. It seems, too, that his rationale
was the same as Roosevelt’s. Reagan was also a believer and faith played an important
part  in  his  life,  even  if  he  wasn’t  a  regular  church-goer.  As  H.W.  Brands  notes:
“[Reagan] explained that his  attendance disrupted the [church] services,  which was
true  enough.  But  his  faith  was  internal  rather  than  institutional.”1 Indeed  the
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president’s  religiosity was idiosyncratic,  albeit  anchored in Christianity.  He thought
that the Bible contained the solutions to all  man-made issues.2 Jesus Christ was the
individual he most admired.3 He, too, felt he had a special relationship with God, to
whom he referred as “the man upstairs.” In fact – following the attempt on his life of
March 30, 1981 – Reagan believed he had been spared for a reason, so he could pursue a
divine will.4 
31 His story, nonetheless, already had hues of the spiritual before this sombre episode. He
wished  to  “renew  the  American  spirit  and  sense  of  purpose,”  as  he  said  in  his
acceptance address at the 1980 Republican national convention.5 For Michael Deaver,
his deputy chief of staff, faith was Reagan’s principal “source of inspiration.”6 It was
also the fundamental attribute he urged Americans to find in themselves, in others and
indirectly  in  his  leadership.7 Just  as  Roosevelt  promised  Americans  that  the  Great
Depression could teach them a lesson about service, Reagan pleaded for them to believe
that the country’s difficulties also had a redemptive purpose.8 Tragedy, in his mind,
could beget transcendence.
32 Scholars have correctly identified that Reagan depicted himself as a “political messiah”
who would bring back hope and prosperity to his country.9 This article shows that,
whilst Reagan did portray himself as a messianic protagonist, he was subtler and less
strident than Roosevelt in doing so – which might be explained by the context of his
times.10 Still  his  language  and  self-characterisation  came  close  to  Roosevelt’s,  and
depicted  the  Republican  as  having  the  necessary  traits  of  a  messiah.  For  instance,
Reagan emphasised his almost supernatural sense of vision, his ability to perceive what
others did not. “Some say that spirit no longer exists,” he lamented. “But,” he added, “I
have seen it – I  have felt it –  all  across the land [emphasis mine].” 11 In saying this,
Reagan differentiated himself not only from other politicians but also, quite literally,
from most other Americans. He could see, more importantly feel, things no one else
did.  Armed  with  his  unique  insight,  Reagan  invited  the  people  to  join  him  on  a
“crusade” – just as Roosevelt had done 48 years prior when he too accepted his party’s
presidential  nomination.  For  Reagan,  as  he  said  upon  accepting  the  Republican
nomination in 1980, the “crusade” was “to make America great again.” For Roosevelt, it
had been to “restore America to its own people.”12 In this crusade, Reagan identified as
the most important weapons not “‘bombs and rockets’ but belief and resolve.”13 Faith,
in other words, was all that was needed to win.
33 Reagan, like Roosevelt, relied on the vocabulary of populism to depict his antagonists
as wicked – and thus contrast himself as a messianic protagonist.  As Michael Kazin
observes, Reagan, borrowing from Roosevelt, claimed he was on the side of common
folk against political elites.14 For both presidents, populism was a natural and logical
strand  of  their  story  –  a  way  to  build  upon  their  messianism.  They  presented
themselves as anointed saviours who would lead the people to newfound success. It
begged one question: who did the people need saving from? Populist rhetoric offered
the answer. By adopting the “us vs. them” structure of populism, Roosevelt and Reagan
were able to zero in on the antagonists of their story. Although they did not have the
same  antagonists  –  Roosevelt  leaned  towards  blaming  corporate  America,  whilst
Reagan was a staunch critic of government bureaucracy – both men shared a common
enemy: the political class.
34 Reagan chastised the political class for their wrongdoings. He depicted politicians as
inhumane, profligate and reckless.15 They were double-faced liars who had betrayed the
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sacred trust of the people. They had taken advantage of their good will, demanding
more  and  more  of  their  hard-earned  money  to  keep  alive  a  bloated  system.  Their
cardinal sin – in other words the grave misdeed committed by Reagan’s antagonists –
was “a theft from [the people’s] pocketbooks.”16 In so doing, they had stripped America
of  its  greatness,  making it  feeble  and leaving its  citizens “frustrated and … a  little
afraid.”17 In contrast, as protagonist, Reagan stood for candour and a spirit of sincerity
in all  things.  He consistently emphasised he spoke the truth,  even if  it  was not an
uplifting one. As a messenger, he refused to be a false prophet, one who “said, ‘Trust
me,’”  but  ignored  the  harm  he  caused.18 Although  he  promised  to  improve  the
country’s situation, he confessed it would not be easy.19 Reagan presented himself as a
reliable truth-teller, unafraid to emphasise the difficulties and challenges that would
arise. That is why he spoke of “regret[ting] to say” the country was in an economic
maelstrom, of being “afraid [his] message … was grim and disturbing.”20 He recognised
he “painted a pretty grim picture,” but insisted it was only a mirror of reality.21 Whilst
both are remembered as optimists, Reagan could have been channelling Roosevelt who
had made a similar point amidst crisis, conceding that “only a foolish optimist [could]
deny the dark realities.”22 It was against this similarly ominous backdrop that Reagan
could starkly define the conflict of his story. He symbolised it as the choice between
two roads. It is worth considering his own words in context here:
One road is all too familiar to us. It leads ultimately to higher taxes. It merely brings
us full circle back to the source of our economic problems, where the government
decides that it knows better than you what should be done with your earnings and,
in fact, how you should conduct your life. The other road promises to renew the
American spirit. It’s a road of hope and opportunity. It places the direction of your
life back in your hands where it belongs.23
35 Reagan portrayed himself as a liberator, granting freedom to a people held captive by
an  oppressive  and  ubiquitous  government,  the  very  government  that  he  famously
lambasted as “in this crisis … not the solution [but] … the problem.”24 Richard Wirthlin,
his pollster and strategist, observed that the president spoke of liberty as a gift that
could only be bestowed by the grace of God.25 And yet in his story, Reagan suggested his
command would give America back its freedom. His programme was about a “vision of
society that frees the energies and ingenuity of our people.”26 His leadership was about
granting a new “compact of freedom” to the people – a sort of covenant between them
and him.27 Therefore, although for Reagan liberty came from providence, he was the
intermediary that made this divine endowment even possible.  In the context of his
story,  he did so by getting Americans to “believe” once again.  As a protagonist,  he
therefore fulfilled – in the same manner as Roosevelt – the basic tenet of the messiah.
He got the people to rekindle their faith. As Reagan later put it in his memoirs, his first
and foremost objective had been to “bring about a spiritual revival in America.”28 But
what exactly did he mean by this?
36 According  to  Gary  Scott  Smith,  in  1983,  two  years  after  he  entered  office,  Reagan
detailed  the  “spiritual  awakening  and  moral  renewal”  that  the country  was
undergoing. He rejoiced in surveys showing a great majority of Americans disapproved
of promiscuity and drug use, opposed abortion, and extolled family values and religious
faith.29 But  Reagan’s  definition  of  a  “spiritual  revival”  did  not  limit  itself  to
championing the conservative values of God and country. It primarily meant restoring
the people’s faith in America itself and its “unique sense of destiny.” They had been
lost,  Reagan  believed,  since  his  predecessor  Jimmy  Carter  had  presided  over  a
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weakening of the nation’s moral fibre.30 Thus, Wirthlin’s campaign plan advised Reagan
to  integrate  “a  morale-building  element”  to  his  “leadership,”  pointing  to  the
presidencies of Roosevelt and John Kennedy as inspirations.31
37 Reagan’s “spiritual revival,” then, had an ineffable quality to it. He saw it as mystical.
This  is  why,  writing  in  1982,  barely  a  year  into  Reagan’s  first  term,  Garry  Wills
ironically dubbed his presidency the “papal presidency.” “His appeal is not to reason
but to faith, to his vision of America as an infallible mother church.”32 Wills implied
that Reagan was a leader animated by a naïve faith, and that this faith was in fact all he
really offered the people. As such, much like the pope, the president became a spiritual
leader rather than a squarely political one.
38 For Reagan but also for Roosevelt, the messianic overtones of their stories dovetailed
with the concept of American civil religion. As Robert Bellah explains: “Behind the civil
religion at every point lie biblical archetypes: Exodus, Chosen People, Promised Land,
New Jerusalem, Sacrificial Death and Rebirth.” Indeed American civil religion, though
distinctive and distinctly American, relies on universal motifs, namely religious ones. “It
is,” according to Bellah, “an understanding of the American experience in the light of
ultimate and universal reality.”33 But, with their stories, the two presidents did more
than implicitly rely on American civil religion. They also strengthened it. By depicting
America as a land needing divine intervention, and portraying themselves as the agents
of that intervention, Roosevelt and Reagan stressed the trope, so key to American civil
religion, that the U.S. was special and set apart by God. And that prosperity would come
about when God’s will was finally carried out in the nation’s politics.
 
Story as Political Strategy
39 In  1933  and  in  1981,  Roosevelt  and  Reagan  both  presented  themselves  as  modern
messiahs  operating  in  conflicted  times,  times  they  depicted  as  rife  with  spiritual
malaise. The two presidents proclaimed a crusade to right society’s wrongs. But what
were the presidents hoping to achieve by telling these stories?1 On a basic level,  of
course,  they  were  hoping to  successfully  launch their  presidency.  Yet,  as  has  been
hinted at throughout this article, their ambition ran much deeper.
40 Both presidents looked to reinvent the political imagination of their day. They wanted
to change political ethos. Telling a story was a strategy to fulfil  this lofty ambition.
(Whether or not one considers they did so is irrelevant to the claim that storytelling
was a way in which they tried to.) The focus here is on proving intent, not assessing
effect or substantiating a result. And Roosevelt and Reagan both intended to change the
assumptions around which American politics revolved. But first, it is necessary to ask
why telling a story would even contribute to this end. In other words, how does story
help develop new political ideas?
41 Stories are a way to hold the public’s attention. In 2004, a Democratic “spin doctor” was
asked why his party had lost the presidential election. His reply was succinct: “They
[the Republicans] produced a narrative, we produced a litany.” What he implied is that
whilst  Democrats  ran  on  the  issues,  Republicans  framed  these  issues  around  a
narrative.  As  he put  it:  “They say,  ‘I’m going to  protect  you from the terrorists  in
Tehran. … We say, ‘We’re for clean air.’”2 Roger Stone, the political strategist whose
career includes work for Reagan campaigns, made a similar point:  “Put out a white
paper on your environmental positions, you will  bore [everyone] … no one will  pay
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attention.”3 But  while  it  is  easy  to  see  how political  storytelling  can  grab  people’s
attention, why would it also help to spread ideas to the public?
42 According  to  Roland  Barthes,  that  is  because  story  is  a  “cognitive  category”  that
enables humans to comprehend the world they live in.4 For Hayden White, “narrative is
a meta-code, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the
nature of a shared reality can be transmitted.”5 But perhaps no one has put it better –
or rather surmised the connection between stories and human beings better – than
evolutionary  psychologist  Jonathan  Gottschall:  “[We  are]  the  primate  Homo  fictus
(fiction man), the great ape with the storytelling mind.”6 Storyteller and film historian
Martin Scorsese goes further. He argues that stories “fulfil a spiritual need that people
have: to share a common memory.”7
43 If Scorsese’s pronouncement of a “common memory” sounds like it could have been
made by Roosevelt or Reagan, given the way that they have been discussed so far, it is
because they shared the sentiment. Roosevelt felt he had a grasp, in his words, of “a
strange and weird sense known as ‘public psychology.’”8 It seems to have been a mix of
intellect and intuition – what Reagan called a “feel” – that enabled both men to get a
sense of what people were thinking, and the kind of ideas to which society would be
receptive.9 To be sure this was only one of the many ways they did so. However, in
regard  to  their  perception  of  public  psychology,  it  is  worth  noting  that  both  men
exchanged letters with ordinary citizens. A perusal of Roosevelt’s speech files shows
that he received suggestions and ideas from segments of the American public. Reagan,
meanwhile, spent a considerable amount of time exchanging letters or telephone calls
with ordinary Americans.10 It was a way for them, in show business parlance, to “know
their audience.”
44 Both Roosevelt  and Reagan, moreover,  understood the emotional power stories had
over  the  public’s  psychology.  During  the  transition  period,  Roosevelt  actually
contributed to a film titled Gabriel  over the White House (1933). It was conceived as a
vehicle advertising the merits of an activist presidency. The film’s fictional president
bore strong similarities with Roosevelt, which critics did not fail to notice. The plot
focused  on  that  president’s  attempt  to  solve  the  Great  Depression,  and  his
transformation  into  a  literal  messiah  after  he  is  visited  by  the  archangel  Gabriel,
leading him to carry God’s will on earth. Roosevelt provided extensive notes on the
script,  and advised on the final  edit.  He later  thanked the film’s  financier,  William
Randolph Hearst, for an engaging film that “should do much to help.”11 The implication
was clear. Roosevelt felt that Gabriel over the White House would contribute to advancing
not  only  his  agenda,  but  also  furthering  his  standing  as  a  new  president.  This
illuminates his thinking at the time that this article covers. And although Roosevelt
would most likely not have used the term political storytelling – it is only very recent –
he certainly understood the power of story, and the role it played in promoting his
politics.  Interestingly,  earlier  in  his  life,  Roosevelt  had  also  tried  his  hand  at
scriptwriting.12 He  had  a  demonstrable  interest  in  the  craft  of  narrative,  hiring
dramatists Orson Welles and Robert E. Sherwood to serve as speechwriters.
45 In Reagan’s case, storytelling was not only his enduring passion, but also the way he
viewed the world. In his youth, Reagan “recreated” baseball on the radio. Sitting in a
studio, he was wired three-character summaries of the game, play by play. He had to
use his imagination to fill in the gaps, keeping listeners hooked by telling a story about
a game he knew almost nothing about. One day, the wire broke midway during a game.
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Untroubled, Reagan simply continued narrating the game, literally inventing it. Of his
stint as a sportscaster, Reagan said: “Making things up. Mixing fact and fiction. [Pause].
What great preparation for politics.”13 Later, Michael Deaver, White House deputy chief
of staff, explained that the president thought in terms of film plots, often justifying his
decisions  according  to  character  and  scenes  from  his  own  Hollywood  pictures.14
Journalist Frances FitzGerald surmises that many collaborators depicted him “as living
in a world of rhetoric,  performances and perception” detached from facts.15 George
Shultz, Reagan’s Secretary of State, explained this in powerful and evocative terms:
Sometimes President Reagan did not seem to care that much about facts … and it
bothered me. On occasion, I would try to correct the inaccurate chronology of a
favorite story about something he had done earlier in the presidency. … He nodded
in agreement and kept right on telling the same story. … Over time, I began to see
another side to his love of storytelling: he used a story to impart a larger message –
and sometimes that message was simply more important to him than the facts. …
People, he felt, believe in and act on the stories they hear and tell about the past.
Stories create meaning. … To Ronald Reagan, today’s events always seemed rooted
in … some story he had incorporated long ago.16
 
Story as a Tool of Transformation
46 The  stories  of  Roosevelt  and  Reagan  both  imparted  a  larger  message:  change  was
coming.  In  depicting  themselves  as  messiahs,  they  gave  this  change a  redemptive
quality. They would, in fact, save the nation from the crisis befalling it, and instil new
values. These new values resulted from the radical re-thinking of political orthodoxies
that  Roosevelt  and  Reagan  advocated.  Beyond  the  examples  highlighted  in  their
speeches, their collaborators attested to their transformative ambition – the end goal
of their stories.
47 Perkins remembered Raymond Moley’s  reaction after Roosevelt’s  inaugural  address.
Moley was one of the president’s oldest aides and a close advisor. (In Reagan’s time, he
would have been called a strategist.) Moley had contributed to the text of the inaugural
but, upon hearing it, he soon realised that Roosevelt had made considerable edits. They
were all  about  fundamentally  changing the role  of  government.  Overwhelmed with
angst  because  of  the  sheer  breadth  of  the  change  Roosevelt  was  talking  about,  he
turned to Perkins. “Well,” he said in a state of exasperation, “he’s taken the ship of
state and he’s turned it right around. We’re going in the opposite direction.”1
48 Of Reagan,  Wirthlin  said  in  no uncertain terms that  “he had entered office  with a
mission. … He hadn’t sought the presidency for fame or fortune. … No, Reagan wanted
to be president for a simple reason: he wanted to transform the world. He wanted to
reshape the way future Americans would live.”2 Wirthlin’s comment was not just an
attempt at legacy-building years after the fact, a nostalgic homage to his mentor.
49 Indeed, internal White House documents from January 1981, when Reagan launched his
presidency, show that the president and his team were already definite about their
desire  to  profoundly  alter  America.  According  to  Gil  Troy,  “[the  president’s]  aides
understood  that  mandates  were  construct.”  Theirs  was  certainly  ambitious.3 In  a
presidential briefing given five days before the inauguration, the following points were
made. First,  “Reagan’s mandate is  ‘change.’” The 1980 election which had seen him
triumph  two  months  before  was  described  as  “an  axial  event  demarking  a  major
political  opportunity.”  It  was  not  a  mere  “bestowal  of  power,”  but  rather  a
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“stewardship opportunity for us to reconsider and restructure the political agenda for
the next two decades.” The conclusion was unambiguous: “The public has sanctioned
the search for a  new public  philosophy to govern America.”4 Reagan’s  conservative
philosophy would be the answer. 
50 The Reagan administration connected their transformative ambition to Roosevelt. In
preparation for the president’s first State of the Union, Richard S. Beal, director of the
Office of Planning and Evaluation, reviewed all similar messages given by predecessors.
On Roosevelt’s first State of the Union, Beal aptly summarised the spirit of the address
as being “no return to the old ways; must go forward to make economic and social
structure  capable  of  dealing  with  modern  life.”  He  concluded  his  analysis  with  a
succinct but admiring assessment: “people behind FDR; a new era.”5 In so doing, Beal
demonstrated the Reagan administration’s historical understanding of Roosevelt as a
transformative  president.  And  given  its  own  mission  statement  to  present  “a  new
public philosophy to govern America,” it was clear they hoped President Reagan would
be  every  bit  as  transformative.  For  Reagan,  just  like  Roosevelt  before  him,  telling
stories to the American people was a way to bring about that transformation.
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ABSTRACTS
This article investigates the rhetoric of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan when
they took office, in 1933 and in 1981, at two moments of crisis. More specifically, it compares and
contrasts the stories the two presidents told the American people through their speeches. It finds
that the stories had strong parallels: Roosevelt and Reagan both depicted America as a land in
decay,  and portrayed themselves as messiahs who would redeem the nation.  Ultimately,  this
article argues that the presidents both used story as strategy. That is to say their stories had a
political  endgame.  Indeed,  Roosevelt’s  and  Reagan’s  messianic  stories  were  tools  to  help
transform American political ethos, and in so doing foster support for their reform agendas.
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